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among	 the	 causes	 of	 tax	 evasion.	 In	 societies	 where	 the	 power	 of	 the	 family	 is	 very	 high,	 the	
quality	of	 public	 institutions	 tends	 to	be	 low.	 This	 connection	 shapes	 the	behavior	of	 taxpayers	
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familiare,	 ogni	 membro	 aiuta	 l’altro	 con	 inconscio	 eroismo,	 accettando	 come	 un	 dovere	










	“The	 first	 source	 of	 power	 is	 the	 family.	 (…)	 Scholars	 have	 always	 recognized	 the	 Italian	











This	paper	aims	 to	 study	 the	 role	played	by	 family	 ties	 in	determining	 the	 level	of	underground	
economy	 in	 a	 country.	 Political	 scientists	 and,	 more	 recently,	 economists,	 advocate	 the	
importance	 of	 family	 ties	 in	 explaining	 social	 capital,	 trust	 in	 public	 institutions,	 political	




Over	 the	 last	 decade,	 a	 growing	 part	 of	 the	 economic	 literature	 on	 tax	 evasion	 has	 extensively	
approached	individual	decisions	to	comply	with	tax	obligations	by	exploring	the	role	of	taxpayers’	
ethics	 and	 morale,	 providing	 robust	 evidence	 that	 tax	 morale,	 citizens’	 ethics,	 and	 quality	 of	




between	 the	 strength	 of	 family	 ties	 and	 the	 level	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy.	 In	 particular,	 we	
construct	a	bridge	between	two	 fields	of	 literature.	First,	 the	 literature	on	 family	 ties	and	social	
capital,	which	advocates	that	the	strength	of	family	ties	are	negatively	correlated	with	the	quality	
of	 social	 capital,	 trust	 in	public	 institutions,	political	participation,	and	economic	outcomes	 (see,	
among	 the	others,	Banfield	 (1958),	Fukuyama	 (1995),	Putnam	(1993),	Bisin-Verdier	 (1998,	2000,	
2010),	Alesina-Giuliano	(2010,	2011)).	Second,	the	literature	on	tax	morale	and	tax	evasion	which	
shows	that	the	level	of	tax	evasion	is	higher	where	the	level	of	tax	morale	and	citizens’	ethics	 is	




We	believe	 that	 family	 ties	 should	be	acknowledged	as	an	 important	 cause	of	 the	underground	
economy	and	 tax	evasion,	because	 they	affect	 the	degree	of	 tax	morale.	 In	 societies	where	 the	
power	of	the	family	is	very	high,	the	quality	of	public	institutions	is	low;	this	fact	strongly	affects	









(2005),	 Schneider	 and	 Enste	 (2000,	 2002),	 and	 Schneider-Buehn	 and	 Montenegro	 (2010).	 In	
addition,	as	a	robustness	check,	we	also	use	data	on	perceived	corruption	(CPI	index	provided	by	
Transparency	 International),	 exploiting	 the	high	 correlation	between	corruption	and	 tax	evasion	
(seeTorgler-Schneider	(2009);	Buehn-Schneider	(2012)).	
	
To	 interpret	 the	correlation	between	family	 ties	and	the	underground	economy,	 in	 terms	of	 the	




the	strength	of	 family	 ties.In	general,	 the	power	of	 the	 family	 seems	 to	depend	strongly	on	 the	
‘role	 of	 the	mother’	within	 the	 family.	 The	 different	 roles	 of	 the	 father	 and	mother	within	 any	
family	 should	 largely	 explain	 the	 ‘familial	 mentality,’	 which	 gives	 rise	 to	 weak	 collective	




supporting	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 family	 ties	 and	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	 underground	
economy	(i.e.,	where	family	ties	are	stronger,	the	degree	of	the	underground	economy	is	higher).	






























pioneeristic	 approach	 of	 Allingham-Sandmo	 (1972),	 which	 look	 at	 tax	 evasion	 as	 a	 problem	 of	
portfolio	 choice;	 essentially,	 taxpayers	 will	 eventually	 decide	 to	 not	 comply	 if	 they	 estimate	 a	
possible	 monetary	 gain	 from	 cheating	 behavior.	 The	 possible	 net	 benefits	 of	 a	 taxpayer	 are	 a	













as	 a	%	of	 the	GDP,	effective	 tax	 rates,	 etc.).	 Such	 indicators	 include	 the	 tax	mix	 (given	 that	 the	
various	 forms	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 taxes	 have	 a	 different	 possibility	 of	 being	 evaded),	 the	
efficiency	 of	 the	 public	 sector,	 the	 quality	 of	 public	 expenditure,	 the	 compliance	 costs	 and	 the	
complexity	of	tax	system,	the	tax	collection	mechanism,	and,	last	but	not	least,	tax	inspection	and	
the	 quality	 and	 structure	 of	 tax	 controls.	 The	 general	 conclusion	 is	 that	 tax	 evasion	 is	 a	 very	
complex	phenomenon,	and	 that	a	multidimensional	or	multidisciplinary	approach	 is	 required.	 In	
general,	tax	deterrence	models	do	not	always	fully	explain	the	compliance	rate	in	countries	where	
tax	 evasion	 is	 widespread,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 exceptional	 rate	 in	 other	 countries	 where	 there	 is	 a	
strong	degree	of	trust,	public	morale,	and	efficiency	of	public	institutions.	
	
Some	studies	have,	however,	 shown	that	 the	 role	of	 tax	 inspection	and	deterrence	measures	 in	
fighting	evasion	are	far	from	clear,	and	are	often	disputed:	“fines	and	tax	auditing	are	unable	to	




















evasion	 in	different	 countries.	However,	 there	 are	 some	 important	 exceptions	 and	 conundrums	
that	still	have	to	be	addressed.	First,	Sweden,	Denmark,	and,	in	general,	all	of	the	Nordic	countries	
have	very	high	 tax	pressure	but	an	astonishingly	 low	ratio	of	 tax	evasion,	according	 to	standard	
estimates.	Second,	why	do	countries	such	as	Italy,	Greece,	and	Portugal	tend	to	show	a	very	high	
ratio	 of	 tax	 evasion?	 Are	 there	 any	 other	 variables,	 apart	 from	 the	 structural	 ones,	 that	 may	
                                                




















notwithstanding	 strong	 tax	 detection	 policies.	 We	 are	 not	 saying	 that	 tax	 inspection	 and	 the	
deterrent	activities	 implemented	by	governments	are	not	 important	or	useful.	More	 simply,	we	
are	 saying	 that	 in	 some	 cases,	 detection	 alone	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 the	 underground	






Over	 the	 last	decade,	 some	papers	have	 tried	 to	assess	 the	 role	of	 tax	morale	 in	explaining	 the	





of	education,	tax	pressure,	 the	 level	and	quality	of	public	expenditure,	 the	policy	of	prosecution	












                                                
4	See	among	others,	Torgler-Schneider	(2006,	2009),	Torgler	(2003,	2004,	2005,	2006,	2007),	Alm-Torgler	(2006),	Feld-






Alm-Martinez-Vasquez-Torgler	 (2006)	 investigated	 transition	 countries,	 and	 obtained	 the	 same	
result;	specifically,	countries	with	low	tax	morale	show	a	clear	pattern	of	a	larger	shadow	economy.	
Torgler-Schneider	 (2009)	 considered	 a	 large	 number	 of	 countries,	 and	 found	 evidence	 that	 a	
higher	degree	of	a	nation’s	tax	morale	reduces	the	size	of	the	shadow	economy	in	that	country.	
Alm-Martinez-Vasquez	 (2007)	 and	 Torgler	 (2005)	 investigated	 the	 role	 of	 tax	 morale	 in	 Latin	
America,	 and	 found	 that	 it	 was	 related	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy.	 Torgler	 (2004)	




The	 role	 of	 tax	morale	 is	 important	 in	 relation	 to	 both	 tax	 structure	 and	 public	 spending.	 In	 a	
recent	 paper,	 Barone	 and	 Mocetti	 (2011)	 investigated	 the	 determinant	 of	 tax	 morale	 at	 the	
municipal	 level	 in	 Italy.	 The	 authors	 showed	 that	 inefficiency	 in	 public	 expenditure	 (negatively)	
shapes	individual	tax	morale;	in	particular,	that	at	the	level	of	Italian	municipalities,	where	public	
spending	 is	 more	 inefficient,	 tax	 morale	 is	 lower,	 even	 when	 the	 authors	 did	 not	 use	 the	 EVS	
(European	Value	Survey)	and	WVS	(World	Value	Survey),	but	the	Survey	on	Household	Income	and	
wealth	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 Italy.	 Therefore,	 even	 when	 using	 a	 different	 data	 set,	 the	 relationship	
between	 tax	morale	 and	 the	main	 characteristics	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 is	 largely	 confirmed.	 The	
implication	 is	 that	 an	 efficient	 public	 service	 provision	may	 promote	 a	 “cooperative	 reaction	 of	
taxpayers	in	the	form	of	a	better	attitude	toward	fiscal	duties.”	
	
The	 evidence	 and	 econometric	 estimates	 show	 that	 in	most	 specifications,	 tax	morale	 is	 highly	
significant	in	explaining	the	level	of	the	underground	economy.	Tax	morale	helps	explain	the	rate	
of	 tax	compliance	and	 the	size	of	 the	shadow	economy	to	a	 substantial	extent.	Furthermore,	 in	





morale;	 b)	 demographic	 and	 ethnic	 status;	 c)	 the	 importance	 of	 faith	 and	 religion;	 in	 general,	
religiosity	 is	 correlated	with	 the	 shadow	economy;	d)	 the	 role	of	 the	 family	and	 the	 strength	of	
family	ties.	
	
Lago-Penas-Lago-Penas	 (2010)	 show	 that	 tax	morale	 in	European	countries	 varies	 regularly	with	
socio-demographic	characteristics,	personal	financial	experiences,	political	attitudes,	and	regional	
GDP,	in	addition	to	some	ethnic	and	linguistic	fractionalizations.	Torgler	(2006)	also	addresses	the	
role	 of	 religion	 in	 shaping	 moral	 value	 and	 tax	 morale	 and,	 therefore,	 tax	 evasion.	 By	 using	 a	
weighted	 ordered	 probit	 model,	 Torgler	 found	 that	 religiosity	 and	 tax	 morale	 are	 positively	





employed	 and	 unemployed,	 for	 upper-class	 individuals,	 and	 is	 also	 positively	 correlated	 with	
education.	National	 pride	 increases	 tax	morale.	 Tax	morale	 is	 stronger	 for	 students	 and	 retired	
people,	 for	 women	 and	 married	 people,	 but	 weaker	 for	 individuals	 living	 together,	 whereas	
financial	satisfaction	increases	tax	morale.	Trustworthiness	increases	tax	morale,	while	perceived	
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Another	 stream	 of	 research7	has	 instead	 emphasized	 the	 models	 of	 cultural	 transmission,	 in	
particular	the	transmission	of	social	status	and	cultural	traits;	however,	we	may	also	assume	the	
same	for	public	morale,	at	 least	for	 its	main	components.	Starting	from	the	economic	models	of	
interdependence	 of	 preferences,	 some	 authors	 have	 argued	 “children	 are	 born	 naïve,	with	 not	




their	 children	 to	 a	 particular	 trait.(…)	 but	 parents	 can	 perceive	 welfare	 of	 their	 children	 only	










matters,	 and	 matters	 a	 great	 deal.	 Family	 shapes	 the	 moral	 values	 of	 individual	 members,	 in	
particular	 the	cultural	 traits	of	 the	youngest,	and	 in	 the	end	affect	public	ethos	and	 tax	morale.	
Therefore,	the	transmission	of	these	cultural	values	within	the	same	family	along	different	periods	





Of	 course,	 apart	 from	 vertical	 transmission,	 there	 is	 also	 some,	 more	 or	 less	 intense,	 form	 of	
oblique	transmission,	where	the	social	context	(e.g.,	school,	neighborly-ness,	etc.)	helps	to	share	
moral	 values.	 In	 general,	we	observe	 strong	homogeneity	 among	 the	 various	 communities,	 and	
people’s	choice	to	reside	in	areas	where	other	individuals	live	that	share	the	same	values.	We	also	
observe	 a	 strong	 persistence	 of	 cultural	 traits,	 attitudes,	 values,	 and	 lifestyles	 among	 various	







(more	 than	 five	centuries)	and	explain	 the	contemporary	variation	of	 social	 capital	 in	 Italy,	with	
                                                
7	See	among	others,	Bisin-Topa	(2002),	Bisin-	Verdier	(1998,	2000,	2010).	
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as	 a	 consequence	 of	 his	 research	 in	 the	 South	 of	 Italy.	 The	 author	 depicts	 family	 as	 “amoral	
familism,”	a	situation	in	which	there	is	“inability	of	the	villagers	to	act	together	for	their	common	
good	or,	indeed,	for	any	end	transcending	the	immediate,	material	interest	of	the	nuclear	family.	
This	 inability	 to	 concert	 activity	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 family	 arises	 from	 an	 ethos	 –	 that	 of	
‘amoral	 familism	 (…)(according	 to	which	people)	maximize	 the	material,	 short	 run	advantage	of	
the	nuclear	family;	and	assume	that	all	others	will	do	likewise”	(p.	9).	
	
Therefore,	 “in	 a	 society	 of	 amoral	 familists,	 no	 one	 will	 further	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 group	 or	
community	 except	 as	 it	 is	 to	 his	 private	 advantage	 to	 do	 so”	 (p.	 83).	 In	 this	 society,	 it	 is	 very	
difficult	to	build	and	maintain	public	organizations	given	the	selfish	attitude	of	individuals	who	rely	
exclusively	 on	 family.	 “The	 inducements	 which	 lead	 people	 to	 contribute	 their	 activity	 to	
organizations	 are	 to	 an	 important	 degree	 unselfish	 (e.g.,	 identification	with	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
organization)	 and	 they	 are	 often	 non-material.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 a	 condition	 of	 successful	
organization	 that	 members	 have	 some	 trust	 in	 each	 other	 and	 some	 loyalty	 to	 the	
organization”(87).	
	
In	a	similar	vein,	 in	1964,	Luigi	Barzini,	 in	an	extraordinary	book	on	“The	 Italians,”	wrote10:	 “the	
first	source	of	power	 is	 the	 family.	 (…)	Scholars	have	always	recognized	the	 Italian	 family	as	 the	
only	 fundamental	 institution	 in	 the	 country,	 a	 spontaneous	 creation	 of	 the	 national	 genius,	





countries	 and	among	other	people,	 “where	 legal	 authority	 is	weak	and	 the	 law	 is	 resented	and	
resisted,	 the	 safety	 and	 welfare	 of	 the	 individual	 are	 mainly	 assured	 by	 the	 family.”	 There	 is,	
however,	an	important	difference	between	the	Italian	case	and	those	of	other	people	who	use	the	
family	as	their	private	lifeboat.	In	Italy,	it	is	not	simply	“a	way	of	life,	a	spontaneous	condition	of	
society,	 a	 natural	 development:	 it	 is	 also	 the	 deliberate	 product	 of	 man’s	 will,	 the	 fruit	 of	 his	
choice;	it	has	been	assiduously	cultivated	and	strengthened	down	the	centuries.”	The	strength	of	
                                                









of	 many	 other	 countries	 in	 Southern	 Europe11and	 Asia),	 and	 has	 attracted	 some	 studies	 and	
research	 projects	 over	 the	 last	 30	 years.	We	 cannot	 provide	 a	 full	 account	 of	 these	 books	 and	
papers	 here;	 instead,	 we	 have	 identified	 some	 interesting	 examples,	 along	 with	 the	 most	






Reduced	participation	 in	 public	 life	 has	 also	 been	 studied	 recently	 in	 the	US	 by	 Robert	 Putnam	








of	 intermediate	 associations	 between	 state	 and	 individual	 has	 been	 relatively	 low,	 reflecting	 a	
pervasive	 distrust	 of	 people	 outside	 the	 family.	 The	 consequences	 for	 industrial	 structure	 are	
similar:	 private	 sector	 firms	 tend	 to	 be	 relatively	 small	 and	 family-controlled,	 while	 large-scale	
enterprises	need	the	support	of	the	state	to	be	viable.”	
	
The	 key	 finding	 is,	 therefore,	 that	 amoral	 familism	 tends	 to	 produce	 a	 special	 and	 stable	 social	




low	 civic	 engagement	 and	 low	 generalized	 trust,	 confidence	 in	 public	 life,	 and	 the	 quality	 of	





However,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 family	 has	 also	 been	 largely	 acknowledged	 in	 other	 related	
contexts.	For	example,	 in	 studies	by	Bisin	and	Verdier	 (2000,	2010)	on	 the	cultural	 transmission	
and	the	evolution	and	persistence	of	ethnic	and	religious	traits	as	dynamic	properties	of	cultural	















c)	 Societies	 that	 rely	 heavily	 on	 families	 tend	 to	 have	 a	 lesser	 degree	 of	 trustworthiness	 and	
confidence	in	public	institutions;	












raises	 the	 issue	of	whether	the	strength	of	 the	 family	could	be	the	main	cause	of	weak	political	
institutions	 and	 low	 social	 capital.	 However,	 a	 strong	 correlation	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	










study	that	attempts	 to	address	 this	 issue.	Our	point	 is	very	simple:	amoral	 familism,	particularly	
strong	 family	 ties,	 tends	 to	 influence	 the	 quality	 of	 institutions,	 since	 the	 end	 product	 is	 a	
particular	 type	 of	 civic	 involvement	 and	 political	 participation.	 All	 of	 this	 inevitably	 affects	 the	
degree	 of	 trust	 of	 various	 specific	 components	 of	 society;	 therefore,	 the	way	 that	 people	 view	
public	institutions	tends	to	matter.		
	
Strong	 family	 ties	 induce	 less	 political	 participation,	 less	 trust	 in	 the	 public	 sector;	 hence	
government	action	may	affect	tax	morale	and	the	underground	economy	in	some	way.	If	one	does	
not	believe	in	(or	trust)	public	action,	why	then	should	one	fully	comply	with	taxes?	




















in	certain	societies	seems	to	strongly	depend	on	 the	 ‘role	of	 the	mother’	within	 the	 family.	The	
different	 role	of	 the	 father	and	 the	mother	within	 the	 family	 should	mostly	explain	 the	 ‘familial	
mentality,’	 which	 gives	 rise	 to	 loose	 collective	 responsibilities	 and	 civic	 involvements.	 Gambino	
(1998,	 39-50)	 and	 Simone	 (2005)	 but,	 before	 them,	 Turiello	 (1887)	 and	 Bachofen	 (1949),	 have	
argued	that	Italy,	as	a	 ‘paese	materno’	 (maternal	country),	tends	to	apply	a	familist	mentality	to	
social	and	public	behaviors.	 It	 is	 important	to	emphasize	that	this	mentality	does	not	necessarily	
derive	from	the	family	itself,	rather	from	the	‘figura	femminile,	che	è	quella	della	donna	in	quanto	
“madre	di	famiglia”	(female	figure	who	is	that	of	the	woman	as	a	“family’s	mother”).	It	is	not	the	
family	 in	 a	 general	 sense	 that	matters	 in	 this	 case15,	 but	 the	 role	 of	 the	 “woman-mother”	 that	
makes	the	‘familist	mentality,’	which	is	better	described	as	‘mother’	or	maternal	mentality’.	
	
Another	 interesting	 example	 of	 the	 key	 relevance	 of	 the	 family	 in	 Italian	 society	 comes	 from	
Barzini	(1958):	“Italy	has	often	been	defined	as	nothing	more	than	a	mosaic	of	millions	of	families,	
sticking	 together	 by	 blind	 instinct,	 like	 colonies	 of	 insects,	 an	 organic	 formation	 rather	 than	 a	
rational	 construction	 of	 written	 statutes	 and	 moral	 imperatives	 […]	 there	 is	 nothing	 new,	
surprising	or	unique.	 In	many	countries	and	among	many	people,	past	and	present,	where	 legal	





patriarchal	 large	 family	based	on	 the	 concept	of	 authority;	 (2)	 a	 family	 in	which	 the	 role	of	 the	
mother	 is	 prevalent	 with	 respect	 to	 that	 of	 the	 father;	 and	 (3)	 an	 extended	 family	 with	 weak	
constraints	within	their	members.	
	
The	 importance	 of	 mother	 mentality	 is	 at	 least	 true	 for	 Italy,	 and	 most	 countries	 in	 Southern	
Europe;	 however,	 clear	 similar	 characteristics	 also	 emerge	 for	 China	 and	 the	 Jewish	
tradition.16However,	it	 is,	of	course,	important	to	stress	that	this	distinction	should	not	be	based	
on	the	‘biological	nature’,	rather	on	a	‘cultural	dimension’	and	should	be	identified	as	the	product	
of	 a	 collective	mental	 structure17.	 This	 ‘mother	mentality’	 tends	 to	produce	a	 specific	 collective	
attitude,	which	strengthens	the	blood	ties	among	family	members,	implies	a	low	level	of	civicness,	
and	a	reduced	degree	of	trust	 in	other	people	and	public	 institutions.	Of	course,	one	 interesting	
issue	may	be	to	assess	how	much	this	phenomenon	depends	on	the	different	 role	 that	a	 father	
usually	has	 in	educating	children	and	transmitting	moral	values	compared	to	that	of	the	mother	

















relations,	 is	 involved	 in	war	 and	 defense	 activities.”	 The	 father	 judges	 his	 children,	 and	 should	
provide	them	with	the	feeling	for	rules	and	order.	The	mother,	instead,	lives	at	home,	is	extremely	
protective,	 tends	to	 justify	 (all)	 their	children,	and	 is	 fully	dedicated	to	their	development19.	The	
mother	has	 a	 key	 role	 in	ensuring	 the	 species	 conservation	and	 the	perpetuation	of	 the	 family.	
Therefore,	the	asymmetric	role	of	the	father	and	the	mother	within	the	family	may	largely	explain	
the	different	effects	of	the	family	on	 individuals,	which	 in	turn	 influence	economic	behavior	and	


















The	 dataset	 combines	 data	 on	 personal	 values	 and	 social	 capital,	with	 an	 index	 of	 the	 shadow	
economy.	Variables	 related	 to	personal	values	are	based	on	different	waves	of	 the	WVS	 (World	
Value	Survey)	and	EVS	(European	Value	Survey).	These	research	projects	collect	national	surveys	
on	 values	 concerning	 a	 large	 number	 of	 issues:	 from	 perceptions	 of	 life	 to	 family	 values,	 from	
personal	beliefs	(on	religion	and	civic	participation)	to	political	involvement,	from	national	identity	
to	public	morale.	The	 level	of	 coverage	changes	every	 time,	both	with	 regard	 to	 the	number	of	
countries	involved	and	the	issues	surveyed;	however,	a	certain	number	of	topics	are	investigated	
using	the	same	questions	in	every	wave.	These	surveys	collect	answers	to	a	single	questionnaire,	
                                                
18Simone	(2005,	84).	






























The	 first	 option	 for	 both	questions	 takes	 the	 value	of	 1,	while	 the	 second	alternative	 takes	 the	






yourself	 to	be	a	religious	person?”	 (religious	person).	Answers	vary	 from	1	to	3,	where	option	1	
represents	 “a	 religious	 person,”	 option	 2	 represents	 “a	 non-religious	 person,”	 and	 option	 3	
represents	“an	atheist.”	The	second	variable	checks	 the	 importance	of	 religion	 in	one’s	own	 life	


















specifically	 investigates	 this	 subject.	 Answers	 to	 the	 question	 range	 from	 1	 to	 4,	 where	 1	





in	 the	usual	way:	 “Underground	economy,	 in	 fact,	 includes	all	market-based	 legal	production	of	
goods	and	services	deliberately	concealed	from	public	authorities	in	order	to	avoid	the	payment	of	
taxes	or	welfare	 contributions,	meeting	 some	 legal	 requirements	 regarding	 the	 labor	market	or	
complying	 with	 administrative	 commitments.”	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 authors	 avoid	 addressing	 other	















its	 average	 value	 in	 1990–2010	 among	 the	 countries	 that	 we	 considered	 in	 the	 econometric	
estimates.	 The	 distribution	 follows	 our	 general	 expectations,	 with	 some	 South	 European	 and	
developing	 countries	 showing	 a	 relatively	 high	 intensity	 of	 family	 ties	 (a	 low	 numerical	 value,	
closer	to	1),	while	the	countries	of	Northern	Europe	tended	to	show	a	high	numerical	value	(low	
family	ties).	The	same	pattern	is	also	confirmed,	with	some	minor	change	s(for	example,	Lithuania,	
Korea,	Hong	Kong,	Estonia),	by	 looking	at	 the	distribution	of	other	 indicators	of	 the	 intensity	of	
family	ties,	as	shown	by	the	variable	help	child	(Figure	3),	which	shows	an	even	higher	strength	of	
the	family	bond.	The	third	indicator,	the	importance	of	the	family	(importance	of	family),	shows	a	
























that	 the	 family	 is	 one	 of	 the	 more	 lasting	 institutions	 (including	 in	 old	 China,	 Italy,	 and	 North	
Africa),	and	that	its	role	tends	to	be	persistent	and	to	change	very	slowly	across	time.	According	to	
our	estimates,	more	than	55%	of	 the	variance	of	 family	 ties	 in	our	sample	of	110,146	 individual	
observations	 is	 explained	 by	 a	 country-fixed	 effect.	 The	 same	 result	 has	 been	 reported	 by	
















Yit = β0 + β1familytiesit + β2fiscalit + β3politicsit 
+ β4trustit+ β5religionit +αi + ηt+ εit 
                          (1) 
	
where	i is	the	country	index	and	t	 is	the	year	index.	The	dependent	variable	Y	 is	our	measure	of	
the	 underground	 economy,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 following	 specification,	 tax	 morale	 and	 corruption.	
Family	 ties	 are	 measured	 using	 “love	 parents,”	 “help	 child,”	 and	 “importance	 of	 family.”	 Tax	
morale	 is	 measured	 by	 using	 the	 four	 previously	 described	 variables:	 “cheating	 on	 taxes,”	






























Since	 many	 variables	 are	 available	 for	 assessing	 the	 role	 of	 family	 ties	 and	 tax	 morale,	 we	




morale	 and	 family	 ties.	 The	 relatively	 high	 value	 of	 the	 eigenvalues	 allows	 us	 to	 use	 just	 one	
component	for	both	groups	of	variables	in	the	econometric	estimates.	
	
Regarding	 the	 variables	 that	 refer	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 religion,	 we	 used	 two	
different	indexes.	We	hypothesized	that	there	might	be	in	general	a	positive	relationship	between	
religion	 and	 the	 underground	 economy;	whereby,	when	 the	 importance	 of	 religion	 is	 high,	 the	
level	 of	 the	 shadow	 economy	might	 tend	 to	 be	 greater.	 However,	 this	 is	 quite	 a	 controversial	
aspect,	 since	 one	 might	 also	 assume	 that	 stronger	 religiosity	 would	 involve	 more	 intense	 tax	
morale,	 an	 increased	 feeling	 for	 respecting	 norms	 and	 values,	 and,	 ultimately,	 a	 lower	 shadow	
economy.23	
	
Finally,	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 variables	 that	 compare	 the	 shadow	 economy	 and	 the	
degree	of	trust	in	public	institutions	and	other	people,	it	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	when	
the	degree	of	trust	is	higher,	the	level	of	the	shadow	economy	becomes	lower.	
                                                
22Tax	morale	has	been	measured	by	different	dimensions,	such	as	a)	claiming	state	benefits	which	you	are	not	entitled	
to;	 b)	 accepting	 bribes	 in	 the	 course	 of	 one’s	 duties;	 c)	 avoiding	 payment	 of	 tickets	 on	 public	 transport;	 and	 d)	
cheating	on	taxes	if	you	have	the	chance.	




It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 the	absence	of	data	 for	 the	 level	of	 the	shadow	economy	(ue)	after	
2007	prevented	us	from	being	able	to	use	the	latest	data	about	family	ties	and	other	independent	









• ue2008i = β^0 + α^i + η1^ 2008 + η2^(2008 * α^i)  
• ue2009i = β^0 + α^i + η1^ 2009 + η2^ (2009 * α^i) 
• ue2010i = β^0 + α^i + η1^ 2010 + η2^ (2010 * α^i) 
 













of	 the	coefficients	 is	 concerned,	all	 variable	have	been	standardized	 to	make	 them	comparable.	
Finally,	to	make	the	results	more	readable,	all	variables	have	been	reversed	(multiplied	by	-1).	So	




strong	 positive	 correlation	 between	 family	 ties	 and	 the	 shadow	 economy	 (ue),	 while	 we	 also	
assume	that	an	increase	in	the	level	of	interest	in	politics,	trust,	and	religiosity	should	reduce	the	
size	of	the	ue.	As	expected,	we	found	a	negative	impact	of	the	interest	of	politics	and	trust	on	ue,	
and	 a	 positive	 effect	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 ue.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 mainstream	 literature,	 we,	




tax	morale.	 As	 expected	we	 find	 a	 negative	 impact	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 tax	morale,	 and	 a	 positive	
effect	of	trust	on	tax	morale.	The	results	for	politics	and	religion	are	ambiguous.	In	conclusion,	we	

























is	 a	 strong	 negative	 correlation	 between	 trust	 and	 family	 ties;26	second,	 we	 believe	 that	 these	
coefficients	are	upward	biased	because	of	 the	problem	of	 reverse	causality	between	 family	 ties	
and	tax	morale.	To	address	this	last	issue	(as	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	paragraph),	we	
performed	 an	 IV	 analysis,	which	 showed	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 tax	morale	 is	 indeed	
negative	and	significant.	
	
As	 a	 further	 robustness	 check,	 in	 Table	 11	 we	 present	 the	 panel	 regression	 of	 family	 ties	 on	











role	 of	 the	mother	and	 role	 of	 the	 father,	 as	 registered	 in	 the	 1981	 European	 Value	 Survey,	 as	
instruments	 for	 the	variables	 love	parents,	help	child,	and	 importance	of	 family.	 These	variables	














estimate	of	 the	effect	of	 the	 role	of	 the	mother	 and	of	 the	 role	of	 the	 father	on	 family	 ties.	 In	







the	 positive	 impact	 of	 family	 ties	 on	 the	 level	 of	 the	 underground	 economy	 is	 confirmed.	
Moreover,	 we	 cannot	 reject	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 family	 ties	 are	 exogenous.	 Therefore,	 we	









magnitude	 of	 the	 coefficient	 ranges	 from	 -0.5045	 to	 -3.0906,	 and	 remains	 highly	 statistically	
































as	 tax	 burden,	 tax	 rates,	 detection	 policy,	 and	 other	 elements	 that	 affect	 compliance)	 and	
subjective	values	(such	as	the	power	of	the	family,	tax	morale,	and	the	degree	of	trust).	
	
The	main	policy	 implications	of	our	results	 is	 that	the	structure	of	society	represents	one	of	 the	
key	factors	that	should	be	taken	into	account	when	designing	policies	aimed	to	reduce	tax	evasion.	






are	 very	 important,	 and	 tend	 to	 have	 evident	 economic,	 moral,	 and	 social	 implications.	 The	
general	 intermediate	 structure	 of	 a	 society	 is	 weakened	when	 the	 family	 is	 the	 only	 source	 of	
personal	relations	and	trust.	This	phenomenon	negatively	affects	political	and	civic	involvements,	
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Table 1.Description, source, and availability of variables 
Variable Description Source Availability 
Dependent variables (Shadow economy, tax morale, corruption) 
ue Shadow economy (% of GDP) Schneider et al. (2000, 2002, 2005, 2010) 1990-2007 
cpiindex Corruption Perception Index (1=high corruption, 10=low corruption) 
Transparency 
International 1995-2010 
tax_morale Principal component among “claiming”, “cheating,” “bribe,” and “transport” 
World Value Survey;  
European Value Survey 1990-2010 
claiming “do you justify: claiming state benefits” (1=never, 10=always) 
cheating “do you justify: cheating on tax” (1=never, 10=always) 
bribe “do you justify: accepting a bribe” (1=never, 10=always) 
transport “do you justify: avoiding fare on public transport” (1=never, 10=always) 
Family ties 
fties_pca Principal component among “family,” “loveparents”, and “helpchild” 
World Value Survey; 
European Value Survey 1990-2010 
family “how important is family in your life” (1=very important, 4=not at all important) 
love parents “love and respect parents” (1=agree, 2=disagree) 
help child “parents should sacrifice own wellbeing for their children” (1=agree, 2=disagree) 
role_mother “relationship between you and your mother” (1=very close, 3=not very close) European Value Survey 1981 
role_father “relationship between you and your father” (1=very close, 3=not very close)  
Control variables 
Fiscal 
Cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, 
and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, 
and income from property or sales (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank, revenue 
data 
1990-2010 
Religion “how important is religion in your life” (1=very important, 4=not at all important) 
World Value Survey; 
European Value Survey 
religiouspersonv114 “are you a religious person” (1=religious person, 3=convinced atheist) 
Trustcc “how much confidence do you have in church” (1=a great deal, 4=none at all) 
trustpeoplev62 “people can be trusted” (1=agree, 2=disagree) 
trustparliav211x “how much confidence you have in the parliament” (1=a great deal, 4=none at all) 
Imppolitics “how important is politics in your life” (1=very important, 4=not at all important) 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Dependent variables (Shadow economy, tax morale, corruption) 
ue 29.22 14.38 6.60 72.50 623 
cpiindex 5.35 2.31 1.50 10.00 610 
tax_morale 0.07 1.01 -2.04 5.12 711 
claiming 1.99 0.53 1.18 4.78 718 
cheating 1.97 0.44 1.00 4.08 718 
bribe 1.56 0.35 1.02 3.36 728 
transport 2.04 0.47 1.09 4.46 711 
Family ties 
fties_pca -0.03 0.95 -1.79 2.47 693 
family 1.14 0.09 1.01 1.47 730 
love parents 1.23 0.16 1.03 1.72 693 
help child 1.35 0.18 1.03 1.80 693 
role_mother 1.57 0.11 1.39 1.77 197 
role_father 1.79 0.13 1.46 1.97 197 
Control variables 
fiscal 26.47 9.87 7.48 78.47 1029 
religionx 2.11 0.60 1.02 3.19 730 
religiouspersonv114 1.32 0.20 1.01 2.01 716 
trustcc 2.16 0.47 1.12 2.97 705 
trustpeoplev62 1.70 0.16 1.24 1.96 746 
trustparliav211x 2.69 0.34 1.65 3.50 701 
imppolitics 2.73 0.26 2.00 3.25 730 




Table 3.Countries for each wave (stars identify outlier countries excluded from the 
regressions) 
Wave 1990 Wave 2000 Wave 2008 
Argentina Albania Morocco Albania Korea (South) 
Austria Algeria Netherlands** Andorra Latvia 
Belarus* Argentina Nigeria Argentina Lithuania*** 
Belgium Austria Pakistan Armenia Luxembourg 
Brazil Bangladesh Peru Australia*** Macedonia 
Bulgaria Belarus* Philippines Austria Malaysia 
Canada Belgium Poland Azerbaijan Mali 
Chile Bosnia Herzeg. Portugal Belarus* Malta 
China* Bulgaria Puerto Rico Belgium Mexico 
Czech Republic* Canada Romania Bosnia Herzeg Moldova 
Denmark Chile Russian Federation Brazil*** Morocco 
Estonia China* Saudi Arabia Bulgaria Netherlands 
Finland Croatia  Singapore Burkina Faso New Zealand 
France Czech Republic* Slovak Republic Canada Norway 
Germany* Denmark Slovenia Chile Peru 
Great Britain Egypt South Africa China* Poland*** 
Hungary Estonia Spain Colombia Portugal 
Iceland Finland Sweden Croatia  Romania*** 
India France Tanzania Czech Republic* Russian Federation 
Ireland Germany* Turkey Denmark Rwanda 
Italy Great Britain Uganda Egypt Slovak Republic 
Japan Greece Ukraine Estonia Slovenia 
Korea (South) Hungary United States Ethiopia South Africa 
Latvia Iceland Venezuela Finland Spain 
Lithuania India Viet Nam France Sweden 
















Portugal Japan  Hong Kong United States 
Romania Jordan  Hungary Uruguay 
Russian Federation Korea (South)  Iceland*** Viet Nam 
Slovak Republic Kyrgyzstan  India Zambia 
Slovenia Latvia**  Indonesia  
South Africa Lithuania  Iran  
Spain Luxembourg  Iraq  
Sweden Macedonia  Ireland  
Switzerland Malta  Italy  
Turkey Mexico  Japan  
United States Moldova  Jordan  




Table 4a.Family ties variables, correlation matrix (country means, all waves). 
  family - “how important 
is family in your life” 
(1=very important, 
4=not at all important) 
loveparents - “love 
and respect parents” 
(1=agree, 2=disagree) 
helpchild - “parents should 
sacrifice own wellbeing for 
their children” (1=agree, 
2=disagree) 
family - “how important is 
family in your life” (1=very 
important, 4=not at all 
important) 
1     
loveparents - “love and 
respect parents” (1=agree, 
2=disagree) 
0.3154 1   
p-value = (0.000)     
helpchild - “parents should 
sacrifice own wellbeing for 
their children” (1=agree, 
2=disagree) 
0.5024 0.4610 1 
p-value = (0.000) p-value = (0.000)   
 
Table 4b.Tax morale variables, correlation matrix (country means, all waves). 






cheating - “do 
you justify: 
cheating on tax” 
(1=never, 
10=always) 
bribe - “do you 
justify: accepting a 
bribe” (1=never, 
10=always) 
transport - “do you 
justify: avoiding fare on 
public transport” 
(1=never, 10=always) 





1       
cheating - “do you 
justify: cheating on 
tax” (1=never, 
10=always) 
0.539 1     
p-value = (0.000)       
bribe - “do you 
justify: accepting a 
bribe” (1=never, 
10=always) 
0.5831 0.6348 1   
p-value = (0.000) p-value = (0.000)    
transport - “do you 
justify: avoiding fare 
on public transport” 
(1=never, 
10=always) 
0.653 0.6929 0.7034 1 










Table 6 Factor analysis of family ties 
!
Tuesday, 2 April 2013 09:32   Page 1
User: Francesco Porcelli   
1 . factor family helpchild loveparents, pcf
(obs=1235)
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     1235
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3
    
         Factor     Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative
    
        Factor1        1.85723      1.17057            0.6191       0.6191
        Factor2        0.68665      0.23054            0.2289       0.8480
        Factor3        0.45612            .            0.1520       1.0000
    
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  =  668.18 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
    
        Variable   Factor1    Uniqueness 
    
          family    0.7690       0.4086  
       helpchild    0.8482       0.2805  
     loveparents    0.7391       0.4537  
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Table 8 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of family 
ties on the shadow economy. All variables are standardized and their values 
increase with the intensity of the variable, years 1990–2007. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.2639*** 0.0788*** 0.0407*** 0.0368*** 0.0411*** 0.0409*** 0.0312* 0.0287* 
  (0.0358) (0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0148) 
Revenue from taxes,       0.0560* 0.0593* 0.0603* 0.0589* 0.0608* 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.0304) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0312) (0.0332) 
Religion             0.0212 0.0766* 
              (0.0354) (0.0446) 
Religious person             0.0391 0.0487* 
              (0.0258) (0.0260) 
Trust people           0.0105   0.0137 
            (0.0100)   (0.0095) 
Trust parliament          0.0071   0.0074 
           (0.0112)   (0.0130) 
Trust church           0.0003   -0.0673** 
            (0.0237)   (0.0258) 
Importance of politics         0.0091     -0.0055 
          (0.0120)     (0.0112) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.0075     0.0115 
          (0.0078)     (0.0099) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 480 480 480 480 451 454 472 446 
Number countries   61 61 61 58 58 60 57 
R-squared 0.0901 0.0523 0.5737 0.5967 0.5967 0.5988 0.5981 0.6005 




Table 9 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of family 
ties on shadow economy. All variables are standardized and their values increase 
with the intensity of the variable, years 1990–2010. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.3080*** 0.0886*** 0.0267** 0.0242* 0.0286** 0.0184 0.0024 -0.0037 
  (0.0342) (0.0254) (0.0132) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0159) (0.0169) 
Revenue from taxes,       0.0577** 0.0550* 0.0586* 0.0594** 0.0560* 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.0288) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0274) (0.0292) 
Religion             0.014 0.0959* 
              (0.0376) (0.0523) 
Religious person             0.0930*** 0.0980*** 
              (0.0307) (0.0280) 
Trust people           -0.0053   0.0065 
            (0.0110)   (0.0093) 
Trust parliament          0.0072   0.0042 
           (0.0117)   (0.0115) 
Trust church           0.0324   -0.0563* 
            (0.0297)   (0.0335) 
Importance of politics         -0.0282**     -0.0351** 
          (0.0136)     (0.0146) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.0126     0.0096 
          (0.0100)     (0.0105) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 615 615 615 615 583 584 604 576 
Number countries   64 64 64 63 62 63 62 
R-squared 0.1068 0.0722 0.6445 0.6626 0.6742 0.6688 0.686 0.7011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of 
family ties on tax morale (principal component). All variables are standardized and 
their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.1370*** -0.2027 -0.2763 -0.2796 -0.2225 -0.3672* -0.4027 -0.2448 
  (0.0398) (0.1978) (0.1947) (0.1996) (0.2053) (0.1901) (0.2646) (0.2235) 
Revenue from taxes,       0.0424 0.0225 0.1041 0.1689 0.1682 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.1878) (0.1917) (0.1747) (0.1737) (0.1589) 
Religion             0.1135 -0.45 
              (0.5580) (0.8835) 
Religious person             0.4052 0.4025 
              (0.4446) (0.6164) 
Trust people           0.2165   0.2641* 
            (0.1428)   (0.1332) 
Trust parliament          -0.0638   -0.226 
           (0.1586)   (0.1374) 
Trust church           0.4612**   0.4416 
            (0.2179)   (0.3166) 
Importance of politics         -0.1516     -0.1979 
          (0.1657)     (0.1677) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.3028     0.1746 
          (0.1887)     (0.2400) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 669 669 669 669 628 638 649 612 
Number countries   64 64 64 63 62 63 62 
R-squared 0.0187 0.0111 0.1575 0.1577 0.198 0.2163 0.1796 0.2575 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11 FE Panel data model (WG estimator) point estimates of the impact of 
family ties on corruption (CPI). All variables are standardized and their values 
increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
pc - family ties 0.4362*** 0.0397 0.0534 0.0567 0.037 0.0832* 0.0951 0.0822 
  (0.0391) (0.0407) (0.0446) (0.0455) (0.0433) (0.0439) (0.0591) (0.0644) 
Revenue from taxes,       -0.0565 -0.0353 -0.0553 -0.0537 -0.0415 
social contributions, and other revenues       (0.0618) (0.0591) (0.0600) (0.0591) (0.0581) 
Religion             0.2308 0.2163 
              (0.2295) (0.2440) 
Religious person             -0.3576*** -0.2708* 
              (0.1172) (0.1480) 
Trust people           -0.0015   0.0142 
            (0.0524)   (0.0501) 
Trust parliament          -0.0783*   -0.0555 
           (0.0437)   (0.0425) 
Trust church           -0.1406*   -0.0479 
            (0.0761)   (0.0937) 
Importance of politics         0.0730*     0.0239 
          (0.0432)     (0.0541) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         -0.0401     -0.0358 
          (0.0602)     (0.0548) 
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS WG WG WG WG WG WG WG 
Observations 462 462 462 462 456 457 462 451 
Number countries   55 55 55 55 54 55 54 
R-squared 0.1732 0.0034 0.0556 0.0597 0.1022 0.0767 0.106 0.1281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 36 
Table 12 OLS point estimates of the impact of the role of the mother and the role of 
the father on family ties, first stage regression. All variables are standardized and 
their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Importance of the role of the mother 0.4481** 0.3323*** 0.2386 0.3191*** 0.3611*** 0.2383*** 
  (0.1737) (0.1262) (0.1516) (0.0805) (0.0867)  (0.0652) 
Importance of the role of the father -0.3517* 0.2764** -0.4465*** -0.3616*** -0.4544*** -0.2467*** 
  (0.1795) (0.1337) (0.1192) (0.0752) (0.1544)  (0.0775) 
Revenue from taxes,   -0.8565***       -0.265*** 
social contributions, and other revenues   (0.1098)        (0.0838) 
Religion     1.4592***     0.6537*** 
      (0.0819)      (0.1179) 
Religious person     -0.6402***     -0.7564*** 
      (0.0803)      (0.0742) 
Trust people       0.6769***   0.2019*** 
        (0.0309)    (0.0584) 
Trust parliament       -0.9040***  -0.1886*** 
        (0.0905)   (0.0565) 
Trust church       0.5542***   0.7025*** 
        (0.0439)    (0.089) 
Importance of politics         -0.6696*** -0.4755*** 
          (0.0592)  (0.0532) 
Political orientation (from right to left)         0.9174*** 0.0853 
          (0.1615)  (0.1593) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
F( 18, 100) =           553.44 
R-squared 0.1018 0.4409 0.5752 0.8213 0.6301 0.9552 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13 OLS and 2SLS point estimates of the impact of family ties on the shadow economy 
using the variable role of the mother and role of the father as instruments for family ties. 
All variables are standardized and their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) 
pc - family ties 0.3881*** 0.6889*** 
  (0.0742) (0.2404) 
Year FE YES YES 
Control variables YES YES 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
Observations 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 
Ho: Family ties are exogenous, F(1, 100)   (p = 0.1683) 
R-squared 0.8068   
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 14 OLS and 2SLS point estimates of the impact of family ties on tax morale using the 
variable role of the mother and role of the father as instruments for family ties. All 
variables are standardized and their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) 
pc - family ties -0.5045*** -3.0906*** 
  (0.1334) (0.7956) 
Year FE YES YES 
Control variables YES YES 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
Observations 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 
Ho: Family ties are exogenous, F(1, 99)    (p = 0.0000) 
R-squared 0.8075   
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 15 OLS and 2SLS point estimates of the impact of family ties on corruption using the 
variable role of the mother and role of the father as instruments for family ties. All 
variables are standardized and their values increase with the intensity of the variable. 
  (1) (2) 
pc - family ties 0.3164*** 1.7365*** 
  (0.1022) (0.5253) 
Year FE YES YES 
Control variables YES YES 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
Observations 119 119 
Number countries 14 14 
Ho: Family ties are exogenous, F(1, 99)    (p = 0.0000) 
R-squared 0.8729   
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 4 Variable importance of family (original measure of scale, 1 = high family 









Figure 6 Relationship between love parents and the shadow economy (original 




Figure 7 Relationship between help child and the shadow economy (original 




Figure 8 Relationship between importance of family and the shadow economy 




Figure 9 Relationship among family ties, the role of the mother, and the role of the 
father, average 1990–2010 (values increase with the intensity of the variable). 
 
 
	
 
